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Smith: Vendor and Purchaser--Rescission of Contract--Tender of Possessio
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
terest of value which was severed from the surplus and assets of
the corporation and was, in effect, a property dividend.18
-WLmAM

VENDOR AND PURCHASER

-

H. WALDRON, JR.

RESCISSION OF CONTRACT

-

TEN-

OF POSSESSION. - A contract for the sale of land provided
that conveyance be made after payment of a specified part of the
price. Time was stipulated to be of the essence. Defendant defaulted, plaintiffs rescinded the contract and sought recovery of
the purchase money. No tender of possession was made but at
the trial plaintiffs stated they were maling arrangements to move.
The lower court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs, which was
reversed on the ground that restoration or an offer to restore
possession was a condition precedent to an action for the purchase
money. Bey v. Kanawha Savings & Loan Ass'n.1
The instant case involved a rather uncommon application of
a principle established by a long line of decisions, both in England2 and America,3 with respect to restoring the status quo where
there has been a rescission of a contract to convey ]and. The comparatively few decisions in point are in accord. 4
It has been held in at least one jurisdiction that failure to
tender reconveyance before commencing suit would not be ground
DER

18 See Metcalf's Estate v. Commissioner, nspra n. 11, in which rights to
subscribe to stock in another corporation had been sold, the court termed
such rights "dividend".
The court in the present case attempts to distinguish that case on the ground that no assets of the parent company in
the instant case were transferred to the new corporation. This distinction is
more apparent than real since the parent corporation bought the stock with
its surplus out of which dividends are presumably declared, and assets were
transferred. See n. 16, mupra.

1174 S. E. 796 (1934).
2Hunt v. Silk, 5 East 449, 102 Eng. Reprint 1142 (1804).
Contract for
the lease of land in which plaintiff refused recovery because of technical
defect in holding of premises two days over a ten day period, Lord Ellenborough says: "Now where a contract is to be rescinded at all, it must be
rescinded in toto and the parties put in statu quo."
8 MAuPIN ON MARKETABLE TrrLE TO REAL ESTATE (3d ed. 1921) § 256.
4Cases dealing with breach of contract by defendant thus giving plaintiff
right to rescind, yet recovery refused at law because of plaintiff's failure to
re-deliver possession are: Weech v. Read, 208 Iowa 1083, 226 N. W. 768
(1929); Hayt v. Bentel, 164 Cal. 680, 126 Pac. 370 (1913); Beekhuis v. Palen,
76 Cal. App. 680, 245 Pac. 795 (1926); Martin v. Chambers, 84 fll. 579
(1877); Gwynne v. Ramsey, 92 Ind. 414 (1883); Mellenthin v. Donovan, 168
Minn. 216, 209 N. W. 623 (1926); Hurst v. Means, 2 Swan (Tenn.) 594
(1853); Phelps v. Mineral Springs Heights Co., 123 Wis. 253, 101 N. W.
364 (1904).
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for a reversal of judgment for the plaintiff.5 That, of course, is a
stronger case than one involving simply a transfer of possession.
It would work no great hardship so to relax the rule that tender
might be made during trial, - such a tender has been deemed
sufficient in equity."
A court of equity will also allow a purchaser of land, although not in possession, a lien for money paid which can be foreclosed on default of the vendor.' The courts of common law will
not, of course, recognize an equitable lien.8 In an action at law,
although the purchaser has possession, he must restore or tender
such possession to the defaulting vendor, placing him completely
in statu quo, while the purchaser, if fortunate enough to gain
judgment, must take his risk with a general lien. Thus, it may
be readily seen that the legal remedy is not entirely satisfactory.
In the principal case, however, if the judgment of the lower
court had been affirmed and the plaintiffs had remained in possession, defendant's only remedy would have been to resort to another
action of either unlawful entry and detainer 9 or ejectment.10
The case serves to illustrate that an oversight as to a more or less
formal matter may defeat the plaintiff though his cause of action
is good on merits.
-HOUSTON

A. SMITH.

5 In an action at law to recover money paid under the contract, the court
says: "It is also urged that plaintiff should have tendered a reconveyance
before commencing suit. It must be admitted that he should have done so,
but his failure in this respect does not entitle defendant to a reversal of
the judgment."
(Tender was made by plaintiff, during trial, of a quitclaim
deed.) Sutton v. Meyering Land Co., 248 Mich. 601, 227 N. W. 783 (1929),
citing Peters v. Fagan, 244 Mich. 46, 221 N. W. 274 (1928).
a The tendency in courts of equity seems to be to allow the purchaser to
make tender of possession in his complaint, or sometimes even after suit has
been commenced. Lightner v. Karantz, 258 Mich. 74, 241 N. W. 841 (1932);
Navilio v. Sica, 113 N. J. Eq. 340, 166 At. 719, 171 Atl. 796 (1933); Plotkin v. Galowitz, 109 N. J. Eq. 304, 157 Atl. 153 (1931); Jacoby v. Duncan,
247 N. Y. S.318, 138 Misc. 177 (1931); Saunders v. Erickson, 45 S. D. 500,
189 N. W. 116 (1922); Empey v. Northwestern & Pac. HIyp., 129 Wash. 392,
225 Pac. 226 (1924). Contra: Masters v. Van Wart, 125 Me. 402, 134 Atl.
539 (1926); Youngman v. Smadbeek, 117 N. Y. S.1030, 64 Misc. 60 (1909);
Sheehan v. McKinstry, 105 Ore. 473, 210 Pac. 167 (1922).
7Everett v. Mansfield, 148 Fed. 374 (C. C. A. 1st, 1906) ; Elterman v. Hyman, 192 N. Y. 113, 84 N. E. 937 (1908); Bryan v. Lofftus, 1 Rob. 12 (Va.
1842). See Note (1926) 45 A. L. R. 352.
8 Lonzello v. D 'Amato, 107 N. J. L. 422, 154 At. 336 (1930); Elterman
v. Hyman, supra n. 7.
9W. VA. REV. CoDE (1931) c. 55, art. 3, § 1.
10 W. VA. Rnv. CODE (1931) c. 55, art. 4, § 1.
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